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2023 Second Alert LTI#10 Leg injury during beam pump installation
On 04 June 2023, Mechanical/Instrument crew were engaged in pre-commissioning activity for Al Burj 213 well. Instrument fitter was removing the load cell cable tape standing near the monkey ladder of beam pump, meanwhile Mechanical PH was aligning the load cell unit fitted on polish rod by operating the manual gear on the rear side of beam pump. During the course of action, the horse head got detached from walking beam, fell on the polish rod of X-mas tree and slid towards monkey ladder, hitting the fitter’s left leg and resulting in injury.
How do you verify that a critical component has been correctly installed before releasing equipment for operation? What independent verification or second-check process is used for high-risk tasks at your worksite? How do you identify and control line-of-fire and dropped-object hazards before work starts? How do you ensure effective communication between different work groups performing simultaneous operations? Verify critical installations, establish exclusion zones, and keep people out of the line of fire
The horse head was not fully secured to the walking beam because the safety bar was incorrectly installed and did not pass through all required slots. Verification of the horse head installation relied on assumption and visual confirmation was inadequate to identify the unsafe condition. The hazard associated with horse head installation and potential structural failure was not adequately identified in the risk assessment and work planning process. Personnel were working within the potential dropped-object and line-of-fire zone during commissioning activities. Communication between work groups was ineffective, and personnel were not alerted before movement of the beam pump system was initiated. Management of Change was not applied when a different beam pump design was introduced, and the change-related risks were not adequately assessed.
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Second Alerts
Document Type:
Safety
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