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2026 2nd Alert HiPo#11 Dropped pipe
The Operation was laying down 3.5” EU Tubing Completion-Pamp Barrel (joint # 9). After breaking out the connection, the Crew member guided the joint through the V-door while Driller was lowering the TDS and then returned to his designated safe zone while the joint was being lowered with the Elevator. While lowering the Pump Barrel, it parted below the top Coupling connection and the Barrel slid through the V-door to ground level, leaving a Pup joint connected to the Elevator. At the time of the incident, the Floorman had moved out of the Line of Fire.
What indicators should make us treat a retrieved completion assembly as potentially weakened, even when no visible damage is observed? How do we verify that everyone is fully outside the line of fire before moving a suspended load? How can we ensure that historical equipment failures and previous lessons learned are considered during task planning? How effective are our current dropped-object controls if a connection suddenly parts during handling? Equipment can fail without visible warning. Ensure all connected equipment are secured during lay down and keep people outside line of fire
The Pump Barrel experienced an internal structural failure at the bimetallic connection, causing it to separate while under normal laydown loads. The degradation occurred beneath the coupling and could not be identified through routine visual inspection on the rig floor. The completion assembly contained dissimilar metals, making the connection susceptible to long-term galvanic corrosion and loss of structural integrity. No engineered secondary containment or physical barrier was available to arrest the tubular once the connection failed. The task required personnel to manually guide the load through the V-door, creating line-of-fire exposure during a dynamic lifting operation The travelling block continued moving while personnel were returning to the designated safe zone. Historical failures and potential integrity concerns associated with similar completion assemblies were not highlighted within the work instructions or well program.
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